The current figures are indisputable as a measure of current public opinion. In the Ipsos BVA poll published in early September, Marine Le Pen garnered between 34 and 36 per cent of voting intentions, depending on the scenario. Jean-Luc Mélenchon stands at between 15 and 17 per cent. Édouard Philippe polls between 14.5 and 16.5 per cent when competing against Gabriel Attal, but rises to between 19 and 22.5 per cent when standing alone for his camp. (Ipsos)
In other words, contrary to the impression that daily political commentary might give, the outcome of the second round is by no means a foregone conclusion.
My hypothesis is, in fact, that we are currently experiencing a period of reaction rather than one of political stabilisation. A proportion of voting intentions reflects extremely strong feelings of anger, concern and a desire for change. The Ipsos election survey conducted in September supports this view: 59 per cent of those surveyed chose ‘concern’ to describe their state of mind, 51 per cent ‘uncertainty’ and 30 per cent ‘anger’. Only 17 per cent cited ‘hope’. (Ipsos)
This obviously does not mean that voters for Marine Le Pen or Jean-Luc Mélenchon would vote solely out of anger. The RN vote rests, in particular, on a particularly solid foundation: Ipsos currently measures loyalty at over 90 per cent amongst Marine Le Pen’s 2022 voters. (Ipsos)
But a presidential election does not take place in a laboratory. Seven months is an eternity in politics. A campaign is only just beginning; candidates are becoming clearer, some are dropping out, alliances are being reshaped, and voters who respond to a survey today may well change their minds.
This is particularly true of the centre. The figures show just how much its fragmentation is currently weighing on its electoral potential. Édouard Philippe is credited with 14.5 to 16.5 per cent when he is also pitted against Gabriel Attal, but can reach 22.5 per cent when he becomes the sole representative of this bloc in certain scenarios tested. (Ipsos)
This is where I’ll venture a personal prediction: I don’t believe the current picture will be the same as that of the first round.
I think that after this period of very strong polarisation, a phase of normalisation could follow. Once the election becomes a concrete reality and it is no longer simply a matter of expressing discontent but of choosing a president, less radical candidates could regain a much more significant role than they have today.
This could benefit a centrist figure, a political heir to Macronism, or a candidate still capable of reshaping this political space. It might also not happen: there is nothing in the data available today to confirm this.
And this is precisely the pitfall of opinion polls when they are turned into prophecies. They do not tell us what the French will do in seven months’ time. They indicate what people say they would do today, given a specific list of candidates and a specific scenario.
The difference is considerable.
Perhaps we will indeed see a second round contested by the two most radical poles of the political landscape. Perhaps, on the contrary, we will discover that September 2026 represented the peak of a wave of anger before a realignment took place.
Opinion polls provide a very clear picture of the present. They do not yet know what spring 2027 will bring.
